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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Edward Nicholas Bursiel appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
guilty plea to one count of enticing a child through the use of the Internet. For 
the first time on appeal Bursiel argues the state violated his due process rights 
by recommending a sentence different than that contemplated by the plea 
agreement. He also argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Forty-six-year-old Bursiel posted a personal ad on the "Casual 
Encounters" section of Craigslist in which he "claimed to be looking for sexual 
encounters with, 'Any race, size, or age. I don't care."' (PSI, p.3.) Posing as a 
14-year-old girl named "Nicki Scott," a detective responded to the ad. (Id.) Over 
the next six days Bursiel engaged in online conversations with "Nicki" and told 
her "she was not too young," and he had previously "been with a 14 year old" 
and "enjoyed teaching her things." (Id.) He also "sent ["Nicki"] a picture of his 
erect penis and explained in detail how he would make her feel 'good' without it 
hurting." (Id.) Bursiel and "Nicki" arranged to meet but, before Bursiel arrived at 
the designated meeting place, officers stopped him and arrested him for child 
enticement. (Id.) At the time of his arrest Bursiel had "two packs of lubricant and 
two condoms in the center console" of his vehicle. (Id.) 
The state charged Bursiel with one count of felony enticing a child through 
the use of the Internet and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material 
harmful to minors. (R., pp.65-66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bursiel pied 
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guilty to the felony enticement charge and the state dismissed the misdemeanor. 
(7/14/14 Tr., p.4, L.3 - p.8, L.21.) The "Written Guilty Plea" set forth additional 
terms of the plea agreement, as follows: 
The State will recommend a sentence of three (3) years 
determinate, ten (10) years indeterminate, not to exceed thirteen 
(13) years, suspended, with sixty (60) days local jail time as a 
condition of probation. Remaining sentencing considerations left to 
the discretion of the Court. Defense free to argue for a lesser 
sentence. 
(R., p.145a 1 (underlining omitted).) The district court also recited these terms 
when taking Bursiel's guilty plea, and Bursiel confirmed that was his 
understanding of the state's offer. (7/14/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-19.) Following the plea 
colloquy, the district court accepted Bursiel's plea and set the matter for 
sentencing. (7/14/14 Tr., p.7, L.22-p.8, L.14; see also R., p.150.) 
At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor made the following 
representation: 
There is a plea agreement in this matter. The plea 
agreement is that the State will recommend a sentence of five 
years fixed, five years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of 
ten years. That that be suspended. That he be placed on 
supervised probation. And that the Court impose 60 days of local 
jail as a condition of that probation. 
(9/5/14 Tr., p.17, L.22 - p.18, L.4.) The prosecutor made no further 
recommendations, and neither Bursiel nor his defense counsel objected to or 
otherwise disputed the prosecutor's representation of the plea agreement. (See 
1 The page of the Clerk's Record on which the purported terms of the plea 
agreement appear is unnumbered but falls between pages 145 and 146. For 
ease of reference, the state will hereinafter cite the unnumbered page as "R., 
p.145a." 
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generally 9/5/14 Tr.) Defense counsel argued for a three-year term of 
supervised probation but did not recommend any specific underlying sentence. 
(9/15/14 Tr., p.18, L.7-p.20, L.13.) Citing Bursiel's "concerning" criminal record 
and the psychosexual evaluation, which "indicate[d] a problem and a lack of 
recognition and a need for treatment," the district court "adopt[ed] the State's 
recommendation for a ten year sentence: Five years fixed, five years 
indeterminate" but retained jurisdiction. (9/15/14 Tr., p.22, L.9 - p.24, L.18.) 
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the 
balance of Bursiel's sentence and placed him on probation.2 (Augmentations: 
3/20/15 Judgment And Disposition On Jurisdictional Review (Probation Granted); 
3/20/15 Amended Judgment And Disposition On Jurisdictional Review 
(Probation Granted).) 
Bursiel timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.167-70, 175-78.) In 
her opening brief, Bursiel's appellate counsel argued, for the first time on appeal, 
that the state breached the plea agreement by recommending an underlying 
sentence in excess of that contemplated by the parties' agreement. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.4-10.) In response to this argument, and with the district court's 
permission, both the county prosecutor and Bursiel's trial counsel filed sworn 
affidavits which, in summary, state that (1) the portion of Bursiel's "Written Guilty 
Plea" that purported to outline the terms of the parties' plea agreement, and that 
2 According to the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, Bursiel is currently 
awaiting an evidentiary hearing on allegations that he has violated his probation. 
See Case Number Result Page for Bonner Co. Case No. CR-2014-2620 at 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberResults.do. 
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was recited by the district court at the change of plea hearing, was incorrect; and 
(2) under the actual terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the parties the 
state was required to recommend a suspended sentence and local jail time as a 
condition of probation but was not bound to recommend any specific underlying 
sentence. ("Motion To Augment Record And Stipulation" (filed 9/24/15); 
"Affidavit" of Louis Marshall and attachments (filed 9/24/15); "Affidavit" of Daniel 
Taylor and attachments (filed 9/24/15); "Order Augmenting Record" (filed 
9/28/15). 3) The district court entered an order "augmenting" the affidavits into 
the trial court record on September 28, 2015. ("Order Augmenting Record" (filed 
9/28/15).) 
3 Contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to 
augment the appellate record with file-stamped copies of the cited motion, 
affidavits and order. For this Court's convenience, copies of the cited documents 
are attached to this brief as Appendix A. 
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ISSUES 
Bursiel states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State breach its obligations under the plea 
agreement by recommending a sentence greater than it had 
agreed to recommend, thus depriving Mr. Bursiel of his right 
to due process of law? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. 
Bursiel following his plea of guilty to enticement? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Should this Court decline to review Bursiel's unpreserved claim that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement because Bursiel cannot show 
from the record that any breach occurred, much less that the alleged 
breach constitutes fundamental error? 
2. Has Bursiel failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an underlying unified sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed, upon his guilty plea to enticing a child through the use of the 
Internet? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Bursiel Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement, 
Much Less That The Alleged Breach Constitutes Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal Bursiel argues the prosecutor violated his due 
process rights by recommending a sentence with a fixed term in excess of that 
contemplated by the plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) This Court 
should decline to entertain Bursiel's unpreserved claim because Bursiel cannot 
show from the existing record that any breach occurred, much less that the 
alleged breach constitutes fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When raised for the first time on appeal, a claim that the state breached a 
plea agreement will only be reviewed for fundamental error. State v. Gomez, 
153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012); State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d 
955 (201 O); State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171, 280 P.3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be 
reviewed by this Court de nova, in accordance with contract law standards." 
State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 244 P.3d 241 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. 
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (and case cited therein); 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009)). 
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C. Bursiel Cannot Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In Relation To 
His Claim That The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement 
Because Bursiel did not object to the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation, in order to be entitled to relief, he has the burden of showing 
the error he claims is fundamental. The fundamental error standard requires 
Bursiel to show (1) a violation of a constitutional right, (2) error that is "clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision," and (3) the alleged error "affected [his] substantial rights, 
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." Stocks, 153 Idaho at 174,280 P.3d at 201 (quoting State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)). Bursiel cannot carry his burden 
of demonstrating fundamental error because he cannot show that the prosecutor 
breached the plea agreement at all, much less that the alleged breach is clear on 
the existing appellate record. 
There is no question that, when the state breaches its obligation under a 
plea agreement to recommend a specific sentence, such breach violates the 
defendant's due process rights. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 136 (citing Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971 )); Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256, 281 P.3d at 93; 
Stocks, 153 Idaho at 173, 280 P.3d at 200; Schultz, 150 Idaho at 99, 244 P.3d at 
243. To establish a due process violation, however, it is Bursiel's burden to 
prove both the existence of a plea agreement and the fact of its breach. Gomez, 
153 Idaho at 257, 281 P.3d at 94 (citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 
226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010) (and case cited therein)). In an attempt to carry this 
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burden, Bursiel's appellate counsel points out that the recommendation the 
prosecutor made at sentencing for an underlying sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed, was "at odds with" the terms of the parties' "oral plea agreement" -
placed on the record by the district court at the change of plea hearing - that 
called for a recommended underlying sentence of thirteen years, with only three 
years fixed. (Appellant's brief, p.6 (citing 7/14/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-11; 9/5/14 Tr., 
p.17, L.23- p.18, L.4); see also R., p.145a.) If the "Written Guilty Plea" and the 
change of plea transcript were the only evidence in the record of the parties' 
agreement, the state would readily acknowledge a potential breach (although not 
necessarily a "clear" one given the possible tactical reasons Bursiel might not 
have objected to a recommendation for an overall shorter sentence); other 
evidence in the record shows, however, that there was no breach. 
After Bursiel's appellate counsel filed her opening brief alleging the 
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation breached the plea agreement, both the 
prosecutor and Bursiel's trial counsel filed sworn affidavits (with attachments) 
disputing there was a breach. (See Appendix A.) According to those affidavits -
attested to by the people who actually negotiated Bursiel's plea agreement - (1) 
the terms of the plea agreement that were set forth in Bursiel's "Written Guilty 
Plea" and recited by the district court at the change of plea hearing were 
incorrect, and (2) under the actual terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the 
parties the state was required to recommend a suspended sentence and local 
jail time as a condition of probation but was not bound to recommend any 
specific underlying sentence. (Id.) Because the individuals who were actually 
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parties to Bursiel's plea agreement have supplemented the trial court record with 
evidence showing the state was never obligated to recommend any specific 
underlying sentence, Bursiel cannot carry his appellate burden of demonstrating 
that the prosecutor's recommendation for a unified sentence of ten years, with 
five years fixed, in any way breached the agreement. 
Even if Bursiel could show a potential breach based on the fact that the 
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was different than that contained in the 
"Written Guilty Plea" and articulated at the change of plea hearing, he certainly 
cannot carry his burden under the fundamental error standard of demonstrating 
the alleged error is clear. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978; see also 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (under "plain-error review" alleged error must be "clear 
or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute"). Tellingly, at no time 
during sentencing did Bursiel or his trial counsel object to the prosecutor's 
sentencing recommendation (see generally 9/5/14 Tr.); nor has Bursiel ever 
moved in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea (see generally R.). 
Apparently without having ever consulted Bursiel's trial attorney, Bursiel's 
appellate attorney posits that trial counsel's failure to object could not have been 
a tactical decision because "[t]here is no strategic advantage to permitting the 
State to advocate in favor of a higher fixed sentence" than that to which the 
parties had previously agreed. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) However, a review of the 
affidavits filed by the prosecutor and Bursiel's trial attorney after Bursiel's 
appellate counsel leveled the allegation of breach clearly suggests the opposite. 
Even if not dispositive as to the terms of the plea agreement and Bursiel's 
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understanding of it, those affidavits show at the very least that the reason trial 
counsel did not object to the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was 
because he did not believe that recommendation actually violated any term of 
the plea agreement he and the prosecutor actually negotiated. (See Appendix 
A.) The error Bursiel's appellate attorney alleges for the first time on appeal is 
thus far from clear and fails under the second prong of the fundamental error 
analysis. 
In Puckett v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court observed that the 
trial court is ordinarily in the best position to adjudicate a breach of plea claim "in 
the first instance." Puckett, 556 U.S. at 140. This is especially true in cases 
such as this one, where the breach is not conceded, because the trial court is 
uniquely situated to determine the relevant facts and, thereby, facilitate appellate 
review. kl The soundness of this rationale is exemplified by the facts of this 
case. Bursiel's appellate attorney argues the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement, but neither Bursiel nor his trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
sentencing recommendation and there is now evidence in the record suggesting 
the agreement that was put on the record at the change of plea hearing was not 
the agreement the parties actually negotiated in order to secure Bursiel's plea. 
In light of this evidence, Bursiel cannot carry his appellate burden of 
demonstrating any error at all, much less one that is clear on the existing record. 
This Court should therefore decline to review Bursiel's unpreserved appellate 
claim. 
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11. 
Bursiel Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Bursiel argues the unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, 
imposed upon his conviction for enticing a child through the use of the Internet is 
excessive in light several "mitigating factors" he claims exist in this case. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) The record, however, supports the sentence 
imposed. Bursiel has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Anderson, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. 
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Bursiel Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to 
establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, Bursiel must show that his 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho 
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 
384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole sentence on 
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appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 
170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not 
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might 
differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Bursiel trolled the Internet for someone of '"[a]ny race, size, or age"' with 
whom to have a sexual encounter. (PSI, p.3.) When someone Bursiel believed 
was a 14-year-old girl responded to Bursiel's ad, Bursiel engaged her in sexually 
explicit conversations, sent her a picture of his erect penis and arranged to meet 
her for sex. (Id.) 
In imposing Bursiel's sentence, the district court indicated it was "looking 
at all four" objectives of sentencing, including the protection of society. (9/5/14 
Tr., p.22, Ls.9-15.) The court was concerned by Bursiel's criminal record, which 
included two prior felony convictions - including a conviction for manufacturing 
and possessing an explosive device for which Bursiel spent 40 months in federal 
prison - as well as two misdemeanor convictions and other charges, such as 
assault and domestic violence, that indicated to the court that Bursiel had 
"issues" or "problems" with women. (9/5/14 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.4; PSI, pp.4-
6.) "The most concerning thing to the Court," however, was the psychosexual 
evaluation which indicated that Bursiel had "a problem and a lack of recognition 
and a need for treatment" that would best be accomplished in a prison setting. 
(9/5/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19; see also Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 20 (opining 
Bursiel "has a low amenability for treatment" and "would be a good candidate for 
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a prison based program").) "Balancing all [of] that out," the district court 
determined, in an exercise of discretion, that an underlying unified sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction was 
reasonable in light of Bursiel's character and the nature of his crime. (9/5/14 Tr., 
p.23, Ls.5-22.) 
On appeal, Bursiel cites his military service, employment history and 
purported remorse as factors he claims the court failed to properly consider in 
fashioning an appropriate sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) All of this 
information was before the court and considered by it at the time of sentencing. 
(See 9/5/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17 (district court indicated it had reviewed the 
presentence report and psychosexual evaluation).) That Bursiel disagrees with 
how the district court weighed the evidence and balanced the objectives of 
sentencing does not show an abuse of discretion. See State v. Windom, 150 
Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In this case, Windom essentially 
asks this Court to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court and reach 
a different conclusion . . .. However, our role is not to reweigh the evidence 
considered by the district court; our role is to determine whether reasonable 
minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district court."). 
Based on the nature of the offense, Bursiel's character, and the 
objectives of sentencing, a unified sentence ten years, with five years fixed, is 
not excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Bursiel has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bursiel's judgment 
and sentence. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2015. 
~ ~ 0 ~--
~FLEMING~:::-
Deputy Attorney General __) 
CERTI Fl CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of October, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/dd 
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BONNERCOUNTYPROSECUTINGATIORNEY 
127 S. First Avenue 
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Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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IN THE DISTBJcr COURT OFTHB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF mAHo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL, 
DOB:
SSN: 
Defendant. 
Case No: CR-2014-2620 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND 
STIPULATION 
BCSO#JJJ·0o6212 
COMES NOW Louis E. Marshall, Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves the 
Court to augment the record with the ad<lition of an Affidavit by both counsel. 
This Motion is necessary as Defendant has filed an appeal with the Idaho Court of Appeals 
alleging that a plea agreement was violated. Counsel for the State, as well as counsel for the 
Defendant, have a continuing ethical duty to provide candor to the Court. The attached Affidavits 
demonstrate the plea agreement in this matter was limited to the State stipulating to argue for a 
suspended sentence. The issue of an underlying sentence was left open for argument for each party. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2015. 
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
127 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6714 
Fax# (208) 263-6726 
~,TATE Gf.~:·AldS ·, 
Co. lfl.f"t"I y tt,r:, :"'NH~--·;:; . 
. ;::" -~~ /8 f\, .. Fl":: T JlJ_,l.,,!t,,L D· ST. 
2015 SEP 21..t P 4: Ob 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL, 
DOB:
SSN: 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonner ) 
AFFIDAVIT 
BCSO#14-006212 
Louis E. Marshall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1.) I am over the age of Eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this 
matter. 
2.) I am the Prosecuting Attorney of Bonner County, Idaho. 
3.) I personally handled the above-named case throughout its course here in 
Bonner Count-;. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Page1of3 
4.) There were plea negotiations with Chief Deputy Public Defender Daniel 
Taylor regarding this case. 
5.) Those negotiations took place both in conversation as well as through e-
mails. 
6.) There was a plea agreement in this case that I would recommend a 
suspended sentence and recommend local jail as a condition of probation. 
7.) There was never an agreement for a specific underlying sentence as part of 
a plea agreement. 
8.) The attached e-mails, which are incorporated herewith, outline the plea 
agreement. The portions of the e-maijs that have been whited out are irrelevant to the 
present case and dealt with a separate criminal matter that Mr. Taylor and I had been 
handling at the time. 
9.) I recognize that a specific underlying period of incarceration of three years 
fixed, ten years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of thirteen years was outlined 
in the Defendant's written plea of guilty. I did not sign that document. 
10.) I further recognize that at some point during the process Judge Buchanan 
said on the record in open court the plea agreement entailed a sentence of three years 
fixed, ten years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of fifteen years. I am 
uncertain as to what was transpiring at that time, but I failed to correct the Court at that 
moment when it was announced at the time of the Defendant's plea. 
11.) The Court's recitation of the Defendant's written guilty plea in terms of the 
proposed sentence does not imply that there was any off-the-record discussion outlining 
that particular sentence. And, in fact, the plea agreement was solely that the State 
wouid recommend probation and not for a specific underiying term. 
AFFIDAVIT 
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Further this Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2015. 
~---
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before this 22nd day of September, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT 
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°'1£~s~ Commission expires: I ,,, ati"' llO 
Louis Marshall 
from: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
Subject: 
ok 
From: Claire Walpole 
Daniel D. Taylor 
Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:53 PM 
Claire Walpole 
Louis Marshall (louismarshall@bcpros.org) 
RE: Bursiel 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:52 PM 
To: Danfel D. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Burslel 
Need a recommendation on the underlying please. 
From: Danlel D. Taylor 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM 
To: cwalpole@co.bonner.ld.us 
Subject: FW: Bursiel 
From: Louis Marshall 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM 
To: Daniel D. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Burslel 
Deal on Bursiel- will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway 
From: Daniel D. Taylor 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM 
To: Louis Marshall (louismarshall@bcpros.org) 
Subject: Burstel 
Probation for Bursiel? 
Louis Marshall 
From: 
Sent 
To: 
Subject: 
Daniel D. Taylor 
Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM 
Louis Marshall 
RE: Bursiel 
Bursiel will p]ead. He said if you would recc probation he would, just got off the 
phone with him. 
From: Louis Marshall 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM 
To: Daniel D. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Bursiel 
Deal on Burslel· will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway 
From: Daniel D. Taylor 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM 
To: Louis Marshall (louismarshafl@bcpros.org) 
Subject: Burslel 
Probation for Bursiel? 
BONNER. COUNTY PROSECUTING A1TORNEY 
127 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
{208) 263-6714 
Fax:1(208)263-6726 
IN THE DISTRICI' COUR.TOFTHE FIRST JUDICIALDISTRICl' OFTBE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL, 
DOB:
SSN: 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
~ ss. 
County of Bonner ) 
Case No: CR-2014-2620 
AFFIDAVIT 
BCS0#14-006212 
Daniel Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1.) I am over the age of Eighteen (18) years and competent to testify in this 
matter. 
2.) I am the Chief Deputy Public Defender for Bonner County, Idaho. 
3.) I personally handled the above-entitled court case and represented to Mr. 
Bursiel throughout his proceedings in District Court here in Bonner County. 
APPIDA'Vrl' 
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4.) At the time of this proceeding in July 2014, Claire Walpole was my Legal 
Assistant. 
5.) Ms. Walpole created the Defendant's written plea of guilty and put the 
proposed underlying sentence as three years fixed. ten years indeterminate, for unified 
sentence of thirteen years. 
6.) My discussions and e-mail correspondence with Mr. Marshall did call for a 
specified underlying sentence to be argued by the State. 
7.) During the pendency of this matter, the State was taking a stance that it 
would be recommending a retained jurisdiction as part of Defendant's sentencing. 
8.) Prior to trial I was able to further negotiate with Mr. Marshall which 
accomplished the State being bound to recommend probation as opposed to a retained 
jurisdiction. 
9.) The attached e-mails, which are incorporated herewith, are a true 
representation of the status of plea negotiations just prior to Defendant pleading guilty. 
The deleted portions of the e-mails are irrelevant as they dealt with a separate case that 
Mr. Marshall and I had been ~orking on. . 
DATED this ~ 1day of September, 2015. er this Affiant sayeth not. 
AFFIDAVIT 
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Louis Marshall 
From: Daniel D. Taylor 
Sent: 
To: 
Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:53 PM 
Claire Walpole 
Cc: 
Subject: 
Louis Marshall (loulsmarshall@bcpros.org) 
RE: Bursiel 
ok 
From: Claire Walpole 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:52 PM 
To: Daniel o. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Burslel 
Need a recommendation on the underlying please. 
From: Daniel D. Taylor 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM 
To: cwalpole@co.bQnner,ld.us 
Subject: FW: Bursfel 
From: Louis ·MarshalJ 
~t: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM 
To: Dan!el o. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Burslel 
Deal on Bursiel- w!II be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway 
From: Daniel O. Taylor 
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM 
To: Louis Marshan (lou1warshall@bcpros.org) 
Subject: Burslel 
Probation for Bursiel? 
1 
Louis Marshall 
From: Daniel 0. Taylor 
Sent: 
To: 
Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM 
Louis Marshall 
Subject: RE: Bursiel 
Bursiel will plead. He said if you would recc probation he would, just got off the 
phone with him. 
From: Louis Marshall 
. Sent: Thursday, July 10, 201'4 10:09 AM 
To: Daniel o. Taylor 
Subject: RE: Burslel 
Deal on Burslel- will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge 8 may send him on a retained anyway 
From: Danie! D. Taylor 
sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM 
To: Louis Marshall (loulsmarshall@bcpros.org) 
Subject: Burslel 
Probation for Bursiel? 
1 
ZJ5 28 P 4: 21 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRl~:OF;~~; i ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR mE COUN'IY OF BONNER. r, -~- -::;·---
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL 
DOB:
SSN: 
Defendant. 
Case No: CR-2014-2620 
ORDER AUGMENTING 
RECORD 
BCSO# 14-006212 
Pursuant to the Motion to Augment Record and Stipulation, along with the 
accompanying Affidavits of Counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the record is augmented by the Affidavits. 
DATED this~ day of September, 2015. , ~i i Lvl.}-_ 
~lu- ~ ·--
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6 q-A day of 0t pf e /'11.IM.__ • 2015, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document as follows: 
Louis E. Marshall 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Coaftaouse mailbox: -Rue ed 
CiwY,~ --Deputy Clerk 
Dan Taylor 
Chief Deputy Public Defender 
Ceurthoase mailbox f'a,)( ed... 
